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Vischer: Martin Luther King Jr.'s Lessons for Lawyers in a Time of Market

Lecture
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.’S LESSONS FOR
LAWYERS IN A TIME OF MARKET
DISRUPTION
Robert K. Vischer*
When I was a second-year litigation associate, I was given my first
case to manage on my own. It struck me as a dry, run-of-the-mill breachof-contract case turning on the allegedly shoddy production of packaging
material. On my first visit to the client’s office, I met with the mid-level
manager who supervised the manufacturing process that led to the
complaint’s allegations. I was planning to spend an hour focusing on our
discovery plan. Instead, I spent more than an hour simply listening before
we started to talk about the specifics of the complaint, much less a
discovery plan. The manager needed to tell me his story, sharing how this
had upset his life, how the allegations threatened his career, and how the
anxiety had created strain in his family. Before my knowledge of the
discovery rules could become a relevant resource, my ability and
willingness to sympathize with the personal turmoil he was experiencing
was the most important professional skill I possessed. Even a “dry”
contract case required me to step into the shoes of another human being.
At the time, though, I did not recognize my initial conversations with
the manager as a core element of professional competence. I assumed that
I was stepping out of the attorney’s role until the point when he was ready
to start talking about the discovery plan, as if engaging him as a person
was conceptually separable from engaging him as a client. I bear much of
the responsibility for my narrow view, but I wonder how my introduction
into the profession might have contributed to my early conception of the
lawyer’s work. Whether “hired gun,” “mouthpiece,” or “photocopier
technician,” the rhetoric on which our professional narrative is built often
gives short shift to the thickness of relationship that lies at the center of
our work, properly understood.
At the risk of sounding wildly naïve and unrealistic, let me suggest
that what is too often missing from our conception of the lawyer’s work is
a rich and full understanding of the human person. The absence is starkly
*
Dean and Mengler Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota).
This Article was delivered as the Tabor Lecture at Valparaiso University Law School in
February 2014. The Article is based in part on, and contains excerpts from, ROBERT K.
VISCHER, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE: LESSONS IN LOVE
AND JUSTICE (2013).
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apparent when one considers the anthropological commitments that
permeated the work and worldview of Martin Luther King Jr. Though he
was not a lawyer, he was an advocate for the interests of others, and he
was a Christian who was able to live out his beliefs in ways that were
accessible and influential to those who did not share the underlying
religious premises. While King’s moral duties were not constrained by
the more particular fiduciary duty that lawyers owe to their clients, I
believe that lawyers overstate the degree to which their moral agency is
so constrained, and in doing so, abdicate moral responsibility for their
work. Lawyers who endeavor to practice with the person at the center, as
King did, will act as: (1) subjects; (2) healers; (3) prophets; and (4) realists.
Let’s take a step back and contextualize this discussion. As even a
casual observer knows by now, the legal profession—or perhaps more
accurately, the legal services market—is in a period of dramatic and
wrenching change. Richard Susskind offers some stark prophecies about
the future of lawyers.1 He focuses on three main drivers of change: “the
‘more-for-less’ challenge, liberalization, and information technology.”2
He argues:
[R]egarding legal work as bespoke in nature is an
unhelpful—if often romantic—fiction. I accept that some
legal issues that arise do call for the application of acute
legal minds and the handcrafting of tailored solutions.
But I believe much less legal work requires bespoke
treatment than many lawyers would have their clients
believe. More than this, I contend that deploying bespoke
techniques in many instances is to adopt cottage-industry
methods when mass production and mass customization
techniques are now available to support the delivery of a
less costly and yet better service.3
The legal jobs he sees in the future hardly conjure up images of Atticus
Finch: legal knowledge engineer, legal technologist, legal process analyst,
and legal project manager.4 All trends seem decidedly against a more
person-centered approach to practice. The focus is currently on efficiency,

RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 3
(2013).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 24.
4
Id. at 111; see HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 4–5 (referencing a main character
from Harper Lee’s book whose profession was a lawyer).
1
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streamlining the process, and avoiding unnecessarily “bespoke”
provisions of legal services.5
Susskind’s forecast not only stands in tension with King’s model of
the trusted counselor and advocate, but also with a more lawyer-specific
prescription offered twenty years ago by Anthony Kronman. In his
widely discussed book, The Lost Lawyer, Kronman lamented the fact that,
from his vantage point in the early 1990s, he was witnessing the demise of
“the belief that the outstanding lawyer—the one who serves as a model
for the rest—is not simply an accomplished technician but a person of
prudence or practical wisdom as well.”6 As this ideal receded from view,
Kronman worried that “lawyers will find it harder to believe their work
provides intrinsic fulfillment of any kind” and thus will conclude “that
their yearning to be engaged in some lifelong endeavor that has value in
its own right can no longer be satisfied in their professional work.”7
Kronman was generally prescient, but there is one point on which he
might have been overly optimistic. “Of course,” he emphasized, “the
external benefits of law practice remain as obvious as before.”8 Kronman
presumed that the lost ideals of the profession are bad for the lawyer’s
ability to derive meaning from legal practice and for the country’s
traditional reliance on lawyers as statesmen.9
What if, though, the failure to reclaim this traditional lawyer’s role not
only hurt the lawyer’s ability to derive meaning from her work and
contribute to the social good, but also made lawyers expendable?10 Did
the loss of what Kronman referred to as “the lawyer-statesman” ideal give
rise to a conception of the lawyer’s role which made that role susceptible
to market-driven obsolescence?11
Note that I am not suggesting that Susskind’s forecast is wrong; he is
undoubtedly better at this sort of prediction than I am. But the future he
predicts is not static nor is the outcome certain. He recognizes that there
will still be a place for personal, face-to-face legal counseling; he just does
not think there will be much place for it.12 But surely lawyers have some
capacity to shape the dynamic, even if the future is not entirely in our

SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 24.
ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2
(1993).
7
Id. at 3.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 3–4.
10
Thanks to my colleague Jerry Organ for helpful conversations developing this line of
thought.
11
KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 3.
12
See SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 10–14 (discussing how technology in the profession will
alter the way lawyers will handle their business).
5
6
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hands. Indeed, there is some evidence that we are already failing to
provide law students with the broad range of competencies that legal
employers want.13 If we train lawyers only to be technicians, if lawyers
conceive of themselves as only technicians, it will be harder for clients to
know what they might be missing when they ask their lawyers to function
only as technicians.
What is the alternative? Kronman’s understanding of the lawyerstatesman entails legal work that begins and ends in relationship. He
referred to the quality of judgment that lawyers must possess as one of
“imaginative sympathy,” which includes both compassion and
detachment.14 “To ensure that he remains sufficiently detached to survey
the alternatives from a vantage point different from any of their own
internal points of view,” according to Kronman, “it is necessary that he
hold something in reserve even while making a maximum effort at
sympathetic understanding.”15
Lawyers who follow King’s example and Kronman’s advice will act
as subjects, not as objects. In other words, they become an active
participant in a dynamic relationship—a subject—not a passive vessel or
conduit for client demands. Kronman emphasized that both counseling
and advocacy roles caution that “a lawyer cannot be the mere minister to
[the client’s] ambition that the narrow view portrays him as being,” for
both roles demand “practical wisdom,” not just “technical knowledge.”16
Lawyers give voice to their clients, without a doubt, but a lawyer is more
than a mouthpiece. A lawyer dedicated to the client’s best interests will
not presume to equate the client’s well-being with the maximization of her
independence and autonomy.
King regularly offered agape as the model for engaging a world that
was hostile to the goals of the civil rights movement.17 “Agape” is the
term used in the Bible to denote sacrificial love, in contrast to “phileo,”
which focuses more on the lover’s feelings for another, rather than on how
the lover can meet the other’s needs.18 When we love those “who oppose

13
See Neil W. Hamilton, Changing Markets Create Opportunities: Emphasizing the
Competencies Legal Employers Use in Hiring New Lawyers (Including Professional
Formation/Professionalism), 65 S.C. L. REV. 547, 552–53 (reporting survey data showing that
both large and small law firms consider trustworthiness, strong relationships, ability to
inspire confidence, and good judgment as “[v]ery [i]mportant to [c]ritically [i]mportant”).
14
KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 72.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 134.
17
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 8–9 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986) [hereinafter
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE].
18
Id. at 8.
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us,” according to King, we speak of agape.19 Agape “is the love of God
working in the lives of men,” and thus “[w]hen we love on the agape level
we love men not because we like them, not because their attitudes and
ways appeal to us, but because God loves them.”20 The key for King was
that agape is a “disinterested love” in the sense that “[i]t is a love in which
the individual seeks not his own good, but the good of his neighbor,” and
does not discriminate “between worthy and unworthy people” or based
on “any qualities people possess.”21 The importance of these demands for
the civil rights movement is obvious, and King made it explicit by
asserting that “the best way to assure oneself that love is disinterested is
to have love for the enemy-neighbor from whom you can expect no good
in return, but only hostility and persecution.”22
Crucially, agape itself springs from the loved one’s needs.23 Loving
the white man, according to King, was a response to the white man’s
needs, for “his soul [was] greatly scarred” by segregation.24 “[T]he white
man need[ed] [the] love [of the African American] to remove his tensions,
insecurities, and fears.”25 Even within the black community of his own
city, King showed that love is not passive—it pushes and challenges. King
worked to motivate the community to organize and persist in the
Montgomery bus boycott.26 In leading the boycott, King asked his
followers to look beyond the hardship it entailed over months of walking,
and by saying this, he was not acting as a passive conduit for the
community’s stated preferences.27 He later wrote that the people, even
though they were “exhausted by the humiliating experiences that they
had constantly faced on the buses . . . came to see that it was ultimately
more honorable to walk the streets in dignity than to ride the buses in
humiliation.”28
King’s approach resonates with Kronman, who emphasized that the
lawyer must assess the client’s judgment from “the perspective of the
client’s own interests,” which requires the lawyer “to place himself in the
client’s position by provisionally accepting his ends and then
imaginatively considering the consequences of pursuing them, with the

Id.
Id. at 8–9.
21
Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
22
Id.
23
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 19.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 425.
27
Id. at 425–28.
28
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., STRENGTH TO LOVE 150 (Fortress Press Ed. 1981) [hereinafter
STRENGTH TO LOVE].
19
20
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same combination of sympathy and detachment the lawyer would
employ if he were deliberating on his own account.”29 King put his own
being into the shoes of his congregants—acknowledging the hardship
caused by walking miles back and forth to work every day—but he
pushed them to embrace a reality that may have laid beyond their view at
the time.
Agape’s lessons for lawyers will go nowhere unless lawyers actually
conceive of themselves as subjects, a task that is easier said than done.
They are not empty vessels or mere extensions of the client’s autonomy.
To be sure, lawyers must also acknowledge their clients as subjects.
Replacing the “lawyer as mouthpiece” paradigm by elevating the lawyer’s
own moral convictions as a trump card over the client’s own commitments
and priorities does not further agape. Lawyers must guard against
overreaching and remain cognizant of the power disparity in many
attorney-client relationships, especially when clients are not sophisticated
in legal analysis or experienced with the intricacies of the legal system. If
the lawyer and client are both subjects, they will act as partners in a moral
dialogue and remain open to the possibility that their partner in the
endeavor may teach them something.
Pushing back against the view of the “lawyer as mouthpiece” is only
possible if trust finds fertile ground in the relationship. The client must
trust that the attorney has the client’s best interests at heart, and that
widening the conversation to encompass considerations beyond the
maximization of the client’s legal rights and privileges need not invariably
function as an entryway for the attorney’s own interests. The attorney
must trust the client enough to listen authentically, to step beyond her
own assumptions long enough to encounter the client as a subject, not as
an object, and to question whether her own perspective accurately reflects
the client’s best interests. The attorney-client relationship requires mutual
trust because approaching the other as a subject requires mutual
vulnerability.
Trust in the legal profession is under tremendous strain right now
given market dynamics and pressure to become less distinct from other
business service providers.30 Large law firms have arguably become less
conducive to trust. As they grow more dependent on mergers and lateral
hiring, they compromise their ability to build a culture shaped by
nonmonetary values. Steven Harper cites an end-of-year email from the

KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 130.
See Robert K. Vischer, Big Law and the Marginalization of Trust, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
165, 187 (2012) (explaining that the legal profession is currently transitioning from “trusting
in” to “trusting that”).
29
30
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chair of global law firm K&L Gates to the firm’s partners spread over
forty-eight worldwide offices:
Many of you came from different cultures. I don't care
about your prior acculturation. . . . We are a US-based
global law firm. US law firms operate on a cash basis of
accounting. Our fees must be collected by midnight
within the fiscal year in which they are due. . . . I couldn't
care less whether it appeals to you. It is who we are and
therefore it is who you are.31
If pursuit of the bottom line is the only value shared among partners,
trust may be in short supply, for trust does not flourish apart from
relationships. A lack of trust among lawyers can impair trust between
lawyer and client, for studies show “that trust and distrust are
contagious.”32 Technology can put additional strain on trust, but need not
crowd out the trust-facilitating bond that can develop between lawyer and
client. As John McGinnis and Russ Pearce point out, relationships of trust
“allow the lawyer to facilitate clients to see their long-term legal selfinterest, even when clients’ passions and confusions cloud that interest.”33
They continue by stating, “[m]achines are unlikely to perform this
bonding function and, thus, will be unlikely to substantially affect this
important aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.”34 Lawyers committed
to agape may not be able to change firm cultures single-handedly, but they
will remain cognizant of the importance of trust as they build
relationships with both colleagues and clients. Technology stands to
transform much of the legal services industry.35
Agape not only helps prevent the attorney and client from being
isolated from each other, but it can also help the attorney avoid the
mistake of presuming that the client is isolated from others. King’s
invocation of agape was geared toward the neighbor’s development of
closer human relationships—breaking down walls between enemies and
encouraging the shared pursuit of higher purposes among friends.36 To
understand why, we need to account for King’s belief in the
STEVEN HARPER, THE LAWYER BUBBLE: A PROFESSION IN CRISIS 118 (2013).
Vischer, supra note 30, at 176.
33
John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence
Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041,
3055 (2014).
34
Id.
35
SUSSKIND, supra note 1, at 10–14; see also Theresa A. Gabaldon, Virtual Virtuous Living:
How Can The I-Generation of Lawyers Best Love And Serve Its Neighbors?, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1045,
1047–61 (2009) (discussing how technology is further transforming the legal profession).
36
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 19–20.
31
32
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interconnectedness of humanity and the unifying narrative of the
universe.
In one of the most famous lines from his Letter from Birmingham Jail,
King proclaimed that “[i]njustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere.”37 He did not mean that injustice unchecked will eventually
affect everyone; instead he was making the more radical claim that
injustice anywhere harms the human community to which we all belong.
As he put it in another context, “[w]e are [all] caught in an inescapable
network of mutuality, tied in[to] a single garment of destiny[, and thus,]
[w]hatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.”38 This view of the
world, which emanates from a theological tradition called personalism,
fundamentally shaped his witness, as he worked tirelessly to repair the
breach in what he referred to as “the beloved community.”39 In a real
sense, King was a healer.
Viewing King’s work as a ministry of healing can help underscore its
distinctiveness. His advocacy for the law’s expansion and enforcement of
individual rights was not geared toward the maximization of autonomy,
as today’s rights rhetoric often seems to be. King instead looked to rights
as tools to help repair the breach in the human community.40 His work to
enhance the legal and political standing of the individual was inseparable
from his work to restore the human community.
Agape teaches lawyers to treat their clients, and themselves, as
subjects, not objects.41 However, personalism broadens the relational
view, challenging lawyers to recognize their potential role as healers—
counselors who can help repair breaches in the human community.42
Personalism speaks not only to the way we relate to our clients, but also
to the way we would hope our clients relate to others.43 A lawyer should
not operate from the presumption that the default function of legal
representation is to maximize the client’s self-interest, as defined in
narrow, individualist terms.
For example, the collapse of Enron was made more likely by lawyers
who were too willing to figure out a way to accomplish whatever their
client expressed a desire to do, rather than stepping back and having a
Id. at 290.
Id.
39
IRA G. ZEPP, JR., THE SOCIAL VISION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 193–94, 209 (1989)
(footnote omitted).
40
See, e.g., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 423–29 (providing one example, the
Montgomery bus boycott, of how Martin Luther King used rights to correct flaws in the
community).
41
Id. at 19–20.
42
ZEPP, supra note 39, at 194.
43
Id.
37
38
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conversation about what should be done.44 Enron’s lawyers appear to
have offered little resistance to, or reflection on, the path charted by
Enron’s management.45 This acquiescence prevented the lawyers from
helping Enron executives take a broader view of the company’s interests.
Personalism’s lessons are not that Enron’s investors must sacrifice their
profits for the greater good, but from the personalist perspective, Enron’s
own interests are invariably wrapped up with, though not always
identical to, the interests of its investors, employees, customers, and
members of the surrounding community. The fact that devotion to shortterm share price has proven to be a recipe for disaster would not surprise
King, who insisted on the empirical reality of the human community.46
Just as lawyers need to engage clients as subjects, lawyers should
encourage clients to view third parties as subjects, not as objects. This does
not just speak to the lawyer’s view of the third party, but also speaks to
the lawyer’s view of the client. For example, the lawyer should not treat
the client as isolated from the rest of the human community. We are not
talking about the ultimate direction of the representation, because the
lawyer owes deference to the client first. If the client persists with an
isolating and narrow conception of her self-interest, then the lawyer’s only
choice is to withdraw or abide by the client’s direction. The important
point is for the lawyer to have the conversation with the client, not to
hijack the representation. The conversation itself may look different
depending on the context. For instance, a lawyer committed to treating
her client as a subject must also remain cognizant of power disparities in
the relationship. A lawyer reminds a client of her relational commitments
in different ways depending on the length of the relationship, the scope of
the matters involved, and the client’s dependence on the lawyer as the
only practical source of legal services, among other factors.
So, we know King practiced agape and that he was a healer.47
Furthermore, King was a prophet. He advocated for a natural, moral law
as an impetus for legal and social reform.48 Most famously, in his Letter
from Birmingham Jail, King applied the moral law to critique segregation:
“Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades
human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because
segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the
See ROBERT K. VISCHER, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL
PRACTICE: LESSONS IN LOVE AND JUSTICE 94–97 (2013) [hereinafter MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.
AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE] (analyzing the problems that led to Enron’s demise).
45
Id.
46
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 36–37, 293 (discussing King’s view on
liberalism, neo-orthodoxy, and existentialism).
47
Id. at 256; ZEPP, supra note 39, at 194.
48
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 293.
44
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segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of
inferiority.”49
King’s worldview formed his prophetic stance. Respect for the
human person serves as the benchmark for justice. A lack of respect not
only denies the dignity of the person disrespected, but also of the person
who failed to show respect. The call to justice is about more than lifting
up the marginalized and oppressed; it is about restoring the relationships
that are breached by marginalization and oppression and connecting us
all as mutually-dependent beings. King, the prophet, calls for justice by
calling to restore community.
A lawyer who embraces King’s prophetic ethics will speak truth to
power. This is difficult to capture in regulatory reforms or discrete action
items. The implications are broader and deeper in two ways. First,
prophetic lawyers call the client to confront reality, including the reality
of the human community, despite how torn and frayed it might be. The
client has a role to play, and a prophetic lawyer can—with due deference
toward the client as ultimate decision-maker—remind the client of that
role. For example, John Yoo ignored the reality of the human community
when he advised the Bush Administration that torture might be
permissible under the necessity defense because “any harm that might
occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to
the harm avoided by preventing [a terrorist] attack.”50 Yoo ignored the
reality of the human community, labeling torture “insignifican[t]” because
the harm avoided casts another human being as a means to an end,
regardless of whether torture can ever be justified.51 In these, and less
dramatic episodes, lawyers too often facilitate their clients’ stated
objectives by pushing third parties to the margins of the human
community, or at least to the margins of the client’s cognizance of the
human community.
Second, prophetic lawyers call the legal profession to confront reality
and to imagine its role in repairing the human community. Occasionally,
this requires lawyers to adopt a confrontational stance toward the
profession. Tom Shaffer believes that the Hebrew prophets “would say
that the trouble with us [lawyers] is not that we tend to be uncivil to one
another,” but rather, “[t]hey might say that we are too civil, civil to the
wrong people, civil in the wrong direction.”52 Our real problem might be
Id.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Office of the Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 41 (Aug. 1, 2002), http://fl1.findlaw.com/
news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S7DF78R4?type=pdf.
51
Id.
52
Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyers as Prophets, 15 ST. THOM. L. REV. 469, 470 (2003).
49
50
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that “we are not angry enough.”53 What if the profession stepped back
from its relentless quest to prevent nonlawyers from providing any
service that could remotely be construed as “practicing law,” put
economic protectionism firmly to the side, and instead focused on the
public’s well-being by balancing the need for affordable services against
the need for attorney-client relationship protections? A prophetic lawyer
must recognize that associations can be every bit as self-absorbed as
individuals, and even more socially corrosive.
Finally, King was a Christian realist; a tradition that dates back to
Augustine.54 King was heavily influenced by the leading twentiethcentury figure in Christian realism, Reinhold Niebuhr.55 In King’s words,
“Niebuhr made me aware of the complexity of human motives and the
reality of sin on every level of man’s existence,” including “the glaring
reality of collective evil.”56 Niebuhr emphasized the persistence of
inordinate self-love as the root of suffering that marks the human
condition.57
Many lawyers work to keep morality out of their client relationships
because they are skeptical about their ability to be neutral, objective
arbiters. This skepticism results in a less-than-inspiring vision of the
lawyer’s role. Law is a complicated machine, and lawyers need to make
sure it runs, but what it is used for is none of the lawyer’s business. King
and Niebuhr might urge lawyers not to permit realism to slide into
cynicism. Their realism included affirmative claims about the nature of
the human person and the responsibilities that flow from it.58
Accordingly, lawyers who take their client’s interests seriously may need
to reconsider their reluctance to raise moral considerations.
Further, we need not rely solely on the claims in the abstract—we can
see Christian realism lived out in King’s work. As a public advocate in
the prophetic tradition, King displayed unwavering commitment to the
Id.
See MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 44, at
31 (discussing the origin of Christian realism from St. Augustine and Reinhold Niebuhr’s
modern influence); STRENGTH TO LOVE, supra note 28, at 135–36 (explaining Christian realism
in further detail).
55
STRENGTH TO LOVE, supra note 28, at 135–36.
56
Id.
57
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE ESSENTIAL REINHOLD NIEBUHR: SELECTED ESSAYS AND
ADDRESSES 169 (Robert McAfee Brown ed., 1986).
58
See, e.g., id. at 169 (“there is no level of human moral or social achievement in which
there is not some corruption of inordinate self-love”); STRENGTH TO LOVE, supra note 28, at
136 (“I am now convinced that the truth about man is found neither in liberalism nor in neoorthodoxy. . . . Protestant liberalism defined man only in terms of his essential nature, his
capacity for good; neo-orthodoxy tended to define man only in terms of his existential
nature, his capacity for evil.”).
53
54
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common good. He was under no professional compulsion to place a
particular client’s interests above those of the broader community.
However, his advocacy reflected a view of reality that changes the
assumptions we make about an individual’s best interests, especially
within the attorney-client relationship.
King was optimistic about the arc of history, but his optimism was not
the sort that allowed him to sit back and watch society’s natural tendencies
work themselves out over time. King credited Niebuhr’s work for helping
him see liberalism’s sentimentality and false idealism.59 Particularly
problematic was the notion that education would eventually eradicate
racism through intellectual enlightenment, given the unavoidable fact that
“reason is darkened by sin.”60 As such, humans have an uncanny ability
“to use our minds to rationalize our actions,” and thus, liberals need to
recognize that “reason by itself is little more than an instrument to justify
man’s defensive ways of thinking.”61 As King explained in an interview,
“the most pervasive mistake I have made was in believing that because
our cause was just, we could be sure that the white ministers of the South,
once their Christian consciences were challenged, would rise to our aid.”62
Alternatively, King resisted focusing exclusively on the human capacity
for evil by striving to keep both good and evil in view.63 King knew that
the capacity for good made his struggle for civil rights possible, but the
capacity for evil made the struggle necessary.
“Christian realism is premised on a pair of anthropological claims: (1)
humans are sinful and therefore fallible, but (2) humans are social and
therefore accountable.”64 Lawyers tend to focus on the first while ignoring
the second. Our own fallibility cautions lawyers against denying the
client’s moral agency or delegating their own moral agency to the
profession as a whole. Our social nature reminds lawyers that the
maximization of a client’s legal rights may not always be in keeping with
the client’s best interests.
There are broader lessons here. To the extent that our political and
legal discourse marginalizes moral considerations or reflects a conception
of the human person as an isolated bundle of rights and interests, we are
not only jeopardizing the common good—we are defying reality. Niebuhr
and King may be able to help lawyers dispel the apparent conflict between
individual autonomy and social accountability.

59
60
61
62
63
64

STRENGTH TO LOVE, supra note 28, at 135–36.
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 17, at 36.
Id.
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 36.
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 251.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/12

Vischer: Martin Luther King Jr.'s Lessons for Lawyers in a Time of Market

2014]

Lessons for Lawyers

213

Lawyers, in their more noble moments, will defend an amoral
conception of lawyering on the ground that it checks lawyers’ temptations
to favor their own interests over the interests of their clients. This
skepticism toward the lawyer’s ability to check her own self-interest also
shapes the profession’s regulatory framework.
For example, the
profession forbids—and will punish—the attorney from accepting certain
representations that create conflicts of interest, even if there is no showing
of actual harm to the client. We do not want lawyers to put themselves in
a position where their own interests will tempt them to give less than
zealous representation to the client. We do not defer to the lawyer who
objects, “but I am a self-disciplined person who can rise above my own
interests and serve my client!” “No,” the profession responds, “the will
to power can never be adequately checked, so we will take the decision
out of your hands.” Niebuhr might be pleased by this line of thinking.
The problem is that this healthy skepticism is often insufficient to
overcome the profession’s devotion to the economic interests of lawyers.
Several years ago, the ABA revised its conflicts rule to permit a firm to
overcome a conflict by screening the conflicted lawyer from the case, so a
lawyer representing a plaintiff in a lawsuit could be hired by the
defendant’s firm in the middle of the case, and that firm could still
represent the defendant against the plaintiff even though the plaintiff’s
lawyer is now part of the firm.65 The ABA will defend the rule as a
prudent acknowledgment of lawyer mobility, and will urge critics to trust
firms’ ability to screen effectively. The curious fact is that the ABA rejected
this proposal several times in the past, but in the midst of the worst
economic downturn in years in the legal profession, the profession made
it substantially easier for lawyers to get hired even when a conflict would
traditionally have prevented it. 66 Niebuhr might notice a bit of selfinterest moving the levers of power.
The more fundamental problem, though, is that the skeptical side of
realism is as far as some of the modern legal profession’s self-conception
gets, but it is not as far as Niebuhr went. As did King, Niebuhr explored
the relationship between love and justice.67 “For Niebuhr, the norm that
65
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2015), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_r
ules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_10_imputation_of_conflicts_of_interest_general_rule
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JZ54-HTTQ (stating the rule for client-lawyer
relationships and the general rule of conflict of interests).
66
See Carolyn B. Lamm, Staying on Message, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2010, at 8 (defending the
amendment as “particularly important for the employment prospects of those whose careers
are affected by the recession”).
67
Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 1567, 1590–91 (1995).
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continues to call humans to further achievement is the law of agape: the
demand to express sacrificial love for all humans, even when they do not
reciprocate.”68 Further, he observed that “love is the law of life, even when
people do not live by the law of love,” and that justice can “prove to men
and nations that there are limits beyond which their rebellion cannot
go.”69 At the same time, justice will not bring repentance “if love does not
shine through the justice,” which does not happen unless and until the
punished behold “the executor of judgment suffering with and for the
victim.”70 Those who strive for perfection learn that “perfection is love
and not justice,” and thereby “obtain mercy while they learn to be
merciful.”71 Those who “imagine themselves righteous,” by contrast, “are
consistently condemned.”72
The elusiveness of justice does not excuse a failure to seek it. “Niebuhr
never used his realism to excuse hopelessness or inaction.”73 He urged
Christians, despite their knowledge of human sinfulness, to overcome the
temptation “to disavow their own responsibility for a tolerable justice in
the world’s affairs.”74 Justice can be an imperfect approximation of the
law of love. As such, justice can be a more authentic measure of love than
the “insufferable sentimentality,” which has afflicted the Church through
the years, as though the world’s problems would be solved “if only men
would love one another.”75 While “love may be the motive of social
action,” Christians must recognize that justice is “the instrument of love
in a world in which self-interest is bound to defy the canons of love on
every level.”76
One reason why realism did not weaken King’s commitment to justice
is that his realism had a firm foundation, which is not simply teetering on
the abyss of a bottomless skepticism. “As a realist, Niebuhr emphasized
the importance of grounding our worldview on an accurate
understanding of the human person, including the social and
transcendent dimensions of human nature.”77 We are not freestanding
bundles of legal interests waiting to be maximized; instead, we are

Id.
NIEBUHR, supra note 57, at 14, 29.
70
Id. at 29
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Id. at 63; MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note
44, at 254.
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NIEBUHR, supra note 57, at 63.
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MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 283.
74
NIEBUHR, supra note 57, at 86.
75
Id. at 96.
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REINHOLD NIEBUHR, AN INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS xxxii (1956).
77
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 283.
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relational in that human nature entails our fulfillment in the lives of
others.
Christian realist lawyers are working toward the good, alongside our
clients, and we are capable of entering into relationships with our clients
centered on certain understandings that flow from our shared human
nature. One such understanding is that our clients themselves are social
beings who are accountable to other social beings. In other words, the
starting point for the attorney-client relationship should not be the
assumption that the client wishes to maximize her own legal interests
without accounting for her social commitments and obligations.
The realist’s awareness of the corrupting power of excessive self-love
means that skepticism is necessary. Blind deference to the justice of “the
system” is never in order. Realist lawyers in the molds of Niebuhr and
King know love should not shun power, and power should not shun love.
Lawyers shun power when they abdicate responsibility for justice to a
professional interest group. They shun love when they equate justice with
rights, and forget that rights are the means for restoring just relationships.
Lawyers must account for a fallen world in our understanding of our
professional roles. A lawyer cannot ignore the power dimension of legal
practice or the profession’s capacity to dress up its own interests as the
public interest. Realist lawyers take to heart Niebuhr’s caution that
privileged groups engage in pervasive self-deception and consistently
identify their own interests as universal.
Legal ethicists are wise to incorporate the fallible nature of lawyers
into their traditional justification of the lawyer’s role. However, they may
be overemphasizing one dimension of that fallibility while largely
disregarding other dimensions. Prudent concern for the client-directed
nature of legal representation should not be allowed to obscure the
importance of moral engagement between lawyer and client. No lawyer
has a monopoly on moral truth so as to justify silencing the client or
subverting the rule of law. The potential for moral engagement to be
abused does not change the need for engagement. King’s realism always
brought to light aspects of our life together that we may prefer to ignore.
For the legal profession, one such aspect is the fact that technically
proficient legal advice will not always serve the client’s interests fully.
At the same time, our fallen human condition is relevant to the
lawyer’s work. Indeed, our fallen condition may tend to reveal itself
among people who are drawn to the practice of law differently than it does
in others. Lawyers’ tendency to define themselves by their intellectual
achievements, their perfectionism, and their drive to win can foster
unhealthy isolation, an avoidance of vulnerability, and a fear-driven selfreliance. Large law firms have realized the awesome profit-maximizing
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power unleashed by building a permanent competition among highly
driven individuals who are afraid to fail. For reasons reflected in the
travails of John Gellene, Joseph Collins, Enron, and others, it is unclear
whether unleashing this power serves either the rule of law or client wellbeing.78 Instead of accounting for the reality of lawyers’ fallen nature,
some aspects of modern legal practice may capitalize on that fallen nature
in the pursuit of short-term interests. For both lawyers and clients,
ignoring the reality of our social nature is a costly proposition.
Both King and Niebuhr saw law’s power to serve as a needed bulwark
against the tendency of inordinate self-love to bring alienation and
disconnection to the human condition. The starting point for the attorneyclient relationship should not be the assumption that the client wishes to
maximize her own legal interests without accounting for her social
commitments and obligations. The importance of acknowledging the
social dimension of a client’s nature, and correspondingly, her well-being,
is not limited to headline-grabbing cases. When a client asks his lawyer
to help negotiate the settlement terms of his divorce, decide how
aggressively to interpret applicable environmental regulations, comply
with arguable disclosure obligations in a real property sale, or write a
hostile letter to the opposing counsel, the lawyer has a choice. She can
start from one of two premises: (1) that the client’s interests should be
defined narrowly in terms directly traceable to the client’s immediate and
tangible benefit; or (2) that the client’s interests include an account of her
decision’s impact on those with whom she is in a relationship. The realist
lawyer will not push the client toward certain results—to do so would be
to ignore both the client’s dignity and the lawyer’s fallibility—but she will
avoid assumptions about the client’s nature that defy reality, including the
social nature of the human person.
The realist lawyer cannot defer to the ABA for a proper accounting of
reality, much less for an account of how the law of love can be reflected in
our pursuit of justice. It depends on the lawyer to take reality seriously.
The Christian realism, championed by Niebuhr and King, takes an
unflinching view of the fallen person. Yet, lawyers are missing the point
if they conclude that the fall totally obscures the person. The flight from
relationships—both ours and those of the client’s—is a flight from reality
and realism.

See MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 6
(2004) (explaining the downfall of Gellene); MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF
THE LEGAL PRACTICE, supra note 44, at 94, 97 (discussing Joseph Collins and Refco’s collapse,
and Enron’s risky business decisions).
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If we are tempted to dismiss King’s example as hopelessly ambitious
for today’s lawyers, perhaps we are setting our expectations too low as a
profession. As Kronman reminds us:
[O]ne important element in a group’s claim to
professional status has very often been the belief that the
work its members do engages a sufficiently broad range
of human capabilities to have a transformative effect on
the members’ personalities, to shape their identities in a
lasting way by promoting the development of a
distinctive professional character.79
Will the market erode—or has it already eroded—our distinctive
professional character?
The qualities of character modeled by King—subject, healer, prophet,
and realist—set the bar high indeed. Are all those roles needed in any
given case? Of course not. Sometimes technical expertise is all that is
required. Nonetheless, if we presume that lawyers bring nothing else to
the table, clients have no reason to expect more than technical expertise.
As Susskind reminds us, that which can be disaggregated and divided
among the lowest bidders as discrete tasks tends to short -circuit any role
that would require coherent—much less comprehensive—knowledge of
the client and her overarching needs and interests. Kronman diagnosed
the disease twenty years ago, but he may not have realized that it was
potentially fatal.
I write “potentially” because lawyers still have something to say about
their future, even it is only on the margins. But to speak into the future,
we need to answer a more fundamental question about who we are in the
present and who we are as professionals. Can we still serve as trusted
counselors who help clients look beyond themselves, not despite their best
interests, but in service to their best interests? If this idea can still gain
traction in today’s profession, we could do worse than look to King as a
model.

79

KRONMAN, supra note 6, at 371.
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